The government of the Soviet Union did not expect the outbreak of the conflict since it was not assumed that the new glasnost policy could increase tensions between ethnic groups. All inter-ethnic and inter-state disputes were ignored or skillfully hidden during the Soviet era.[1] Therefore, while shedding light on the conflict, Politburo adviser Vyacheslav Mikhailov admitted that this was a completely new issue for them. The government of the Soviet Union did not hesitate and immediately became involved in the process. However, the conventional methods that were used to halt mass demonstrations were deemed obsolete in the framework of the new Soviet reforms of that time. The Politburo accordingly advised the Azerbaijani party leader to use persuasion as a method instead of force.[2]

Armenia’s claims on Azerbaijani territory directly challenged the Soviet Union’s interests. In his speech on Nagorno-Karabakh, Mikhail Gorbachev stated that there were nineteen potential territorial conflicts in the Soviet Union, and he did not want to set a precedent by making concessions on any of them. Soviet leaders were aware that the domino effect of Nagorno-Karabakh could reach other parts of the Union, which ultimately could be drastic for the state as a whole. The first official initiative by Moscow on this matter was to establish a dialogue between the parties. Therefore, two large delegations were sent to the region.[3] However, their visit was unable to prevent the Armenian protests in Khankendi from escalating. As a result of this escalation, Armenians perpetrated the first violence against Azerbaijanis.[4]

Later, when the protests spread outside Nagorno-Karabakh, around one million people joined the demonstrations in Yerevan. Gorbachev welcomed the Armenian delegate so that the issue could be discussed. Nevertheless, he refused to accept Armenians’ demands for the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. On March 23, 1988, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union rejected demands by the NKAO Soviet to be united with Armenia. On July 18, the Presidium again reacted in a similar manner and annulled the decision by the NKAO Soviet regarding unification with Armenia, and it reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.[5] Additionally, Moscow officially established a special commission to monitor how the situation developed in Azerbaijan and Armenia.[6] On January 12, 1989, in an attempt to prevent the further escalation of the conflict, the central authorities in Moscow unilaterally removed the NKAO from the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijan SSR and established a “special government administration” directly subordinated to the Soviet central government, without prior consultation with the Azerbaijani leadership.[7]

The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh perceived the decision as a significant step toward the eventual unification of the region with the Armenian SSR.[8] Later, it became clear that Moscow was officially incapable of resolving the conflict between the parties. Therefore, it annulled the special administration decision on the region and returned it to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan.[9] After the conflict escalated in this way, particularly during the spring and summer of 1991, when Armenians attacked Azerbaijani settlements, Moscow responded to this process by carrying out military and police operations by joint Soviet and Azerbaijani forces.[10] However, the political process in Moscow in the summer of 1991 led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the region on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the conflict unresolved.[11]

The Soviet authority was unable to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, and the policy implemented during that period by the Soviet authority was even one of the main reasons why the conflict escalated further. Moreover, the inadequate reaction to the conflict by high-ranking officials of the Soviet Union caused tensions to increase between the parties and ended up in an armed conflict.

[1] Horowitz, “Identities Unbound Escalating Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan,” p. 54.

[2] De Waal, Black Garden, p. 11–13.

[3] De Waal, Black Garden, p. 13.

[4] Dragadze, “The Armenian: Azerbaijani Conflict: Structure and Sentiment,” p. 56.

[5] Cornell, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, p. 20

[6] Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.198.

[7] Başer, Bahar, “Third Party Mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh: Part of the Cure or Part of the Disease?” Journal of Central Asian & Caucasian Studies, Vol, 3, No. 5, 2008 p. 90.

[8] Cornell, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, p. 21.

[9] Başer, “Third Party Mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh,” p. 90.

[10] Cornell, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, p. 21.

[11] Başer, “Third Party Mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh,” p. 90.