When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR in 1985, he began implementing new policies called perestroika and glasnost, which sought to solve problems within the Union.[1] At the time, the USSR was still considered one of the great world powers, along with the US. However, due to high military expenditures, the country’s economic situation was worsening dramatically.[2] Gorbachev’s principal aim was to resolve these economic issues, and he, therefore, understood that social reform in the Soviet Union was inevitable if he wanted to achieve his economic goals. To this end, he mentioned that without democratization, it would be difficult to realize perestroika and glasnost. In particular, the glasnost policy sought to develop democracy in the country by guaranteeing freedom of speech and a multi-party system.

 Thus, as a result, nationalist ideologies were crucially revived after the USSR’s democratization endeavors. According to Beissinger, “nationalism exercised an unusual force of attraction within the Soviet society during the perestroika and glasnost years that was unparalleled by any other set of issues.”[3] In the early stages, the glasnost did not contain a strong nationalist component. However, later on, when Armenia raised protests over Karabakh in 1988, it entered a new stage, and the government could not manage to control it. Due to these endeavors, the outburst of ethnic group mobilization spread to the Baltic States, Transcaucasia, Ukraine, and Moldova.[4] Before glasnost, tensions among ethnic groups in the USSR were not considered. However, the glasnost policy led to the rise of nationalism, which ultimately revealed hidden disputes among ethnic groups that had remained frozen for a long time.[5]

 Indeed, it should be remembered that Armenia’s claim over Nagorno-Karabakh was not a new issue. Even during Soviet times, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians periodically asked the central government for unification with the Armenian SSR,[6] and Gorbachev’s glasnost policy only created a suitable opportunity for Armenia to realize its goals. On the one hand, the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Western countries enabled Armenia to establish direct communication with the Armenian Diaspora and strengthen its position in the international arena.[7] On the other hand, the Armenian Diaspora played a pivotal role in shaping international public opinion by disseminating propaganda that promoted Armenia’s position and portrayed Azerbaijan negatively in the context of the conflict.[8] Moreover, after the dispute intensified, the Armenian Diaspora began to assist Armenia financially and militarily by supplying weapons and militants.[9]

The democratization process in the USSR allowed Armenian mass media to express Armenia’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue freely. Furthermore, Armenian intellectuals who were the main driving force in the Karabakh movement stressed, in both local and international media outlets, the need to annex Karabakh to Armenia in order to restore ‘historical justice.’ “Inspired” by democratization, Armenians began to organize an ecological demonstration that later turned into a political movement with the involvement of 1/3 of the country’s population.[10] The political mobilization of Armenians resulted in the establishment of organizations such as “Karabakh Committee,” “Krunk,”[11] and the Pan-Armenian National Movement political party, founded by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who later became the first president of Armenia and played a leading role in the Karabakh movement. Therefore, Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost policies were crucial in establishing suitable conditions for separatist Armenians to undertake previously planned projects.

[1] Siegelbaum, Lewis, “Perestroika and Glasnost,” Seventeen Moments in Soviet History: An online archive of primary source; http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1985-2/perestroika-and-glasnost/. Accessed on December 2, 2024.

[2] Gitomirski, Sasha, “Glasnost and Perestroika,” The Cold War Museum; http://www.coldwar.org/articles/80s/glasnostandperestroika.asp. Accessed on December 2, 2024.

[3] Beissinger, Mark R., “Nationalism and the Collapse of the Soviet Communism,” Contemporary European History, Vol. 18, No. 03, 2009, p. 336.

[4] Beissinger, “Nationalism and the Collapse of the Soviet Communism,” p. 338.

[5] Horowitz, Shale, “Identities Unbound Escalating Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan,” in Lobell, Steven L. and Maucery, Philip (eds.), Ethnic Conflicts and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation (Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 54.

[6] De Waal, Thomas, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York University Press, 2003), p. 16.

[7] Shain, Yossi and Barth, Aharon, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory,” International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2003, pp. 468–471.

[8] Shain and Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory,” p. 109.

[9] De Waal, Black Garden, p. 16.

[10] De Waal, Black Garden, p. 16.

[11] Suny, Ronald Grigor, “Soviet Armenia, 1921–91,” in Herzig, Edmund and Kurkchiyan, Marina (eds.), The Armenians: Past and Present in the Making of National Identity (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), p. 122.